

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 EB-08

NRC-05 OES-07 FEAE-00 DODE-00 ERDA-05 SS-15 SP-02

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0604

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 7290

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJ: CCD: US/USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS, ROUND FIVE:

US QUESTIONS ON USSR PRESENTATION: MESSAGE NO. 6

REF: GENEVA 7212

1. AT AUGUST 25 MEETING OF US/USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS, US DEL POSED TECHNICAL QUESTION RELATED TO SCOPE, DESTRUCTION, AND VERIFICATION ASPECTS OF SOVIET PRESENTATIONS AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS. TEXT OF QUESTIONS FOLLOW BELOW:

BEGIN TEXT: QUESTIONS ON SCOPE

1. IN BASIC PROVISION NO. 1 IT IS STATED THAT "THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION SHOULD BE DETERMINED "IN ACCORDANCW TITH POSSIBILITIES OF CARRYING OUT MEASURES OF CONTROL OVER THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATES PARTIES." THIS SUGGESTS THAT CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON CHEMICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET SIDE BECAUSE THE ONLY METHODS OF VERIFICATION ARE THOUGHT TO BE UNACCEPTABLY INTRUSIVE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION FO THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS
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PORION OF BASIC PROVISION NO. 1.

2. WE ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE INTENDED PURPOSE AND PRACTICAL EFFECT OF BASIC PROVISION NO. 3 WHICH IS FORMULATED IN A COMPLEX WAY AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO ADD MUCH TO THE OTHER PROVISIONS. WE WOULD WELCOME AN EXPLANATION OF THIS BASIC PROVISION, WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN

THE SOVIET PRESENTATIONS ON SCOPE.

3. BASIC PROVISION NO. 4 APPEARS TO DEFINE SINGLE-PURPOSE PRECURSORS AS "PREDECESSORS AT THE FINAL STAGE OF FORMATION." WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF THIS WAS IN FACT INTENDED TO BE A DEFINITION SINCE SUCH A DEFINITION WOULD APPEAR TO ALLOW PRODUCTION OF SINGLE-PURPOSE CHEMICALS WHICH ARE USED IN EARLIER STAGES OF THE PRODUCTION PROCESS. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO KNOW HOW THE PROVISIONS OUTLINED BY THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD AFFECT THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF SUCH SINGLE-PURPOSE INTERMEDIATES.

4. THE LAST SENTENCE OF BASIC PROVISION NO. 7 REFERS TO "MEASURES LIMITING THE ACTIVITIES WITH REGARD TO DUAL-PURPOSE HARMFUL AGENTS WHICH MAY BE USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES." WE WOULD APPRECIATE MORE INFORMATION ON THE LIMITS WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE HAS IN MIND.

5. SOVIET BASIC PROVISION NO. 8 SUGGESTS THAT THE NUMBER OF PRECURSORS TO BE PROHIBITED SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE SINGLE-PURPOSE PRECURSORS USED IN BINARY OR MULTI-COMPONENT CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER, PROVISION NO. 9 SUGGESTS THAT ALL SINGLE-PURPOSE PRECURSORS SHOULD BE PROHIBITED. IS IT INTENDED THAT SINGLE-PURPOSE CHEMICALS USED IN THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS BY CONVENTIONAL MANUFACTURING METHODS BE PROHIBITED?
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6. IN THE SOVIET BASIC PROVISIONS THERE APPEARS TO BE A POSSIBLE INCONSISTENCY IN THE USE OF THE WORDS "DEVELOPMENT" AND THE WORD "TESTING". IN SOME CASES IT APPEARS THAT TESTING IS CONSIDERED PART OF DEVELOPMENT. EXAMPLES ARE FOUND IN PROVISION NO. 2 (LINE 2) AND PROVISION NO. 9 (LINE 5). IN OTHER CASES SEPARATE REFERENCES ARE MADE TO "DEVELOPMENT" AND TO "TESTING". THIS WOULD SUGGEST THAT TESTING IS NOT CONSIDERED PART OF DEVELOPMENT. EXAMPLES ARE FOUND IN PROVISION NO. 2 (LINE 5), PROVISION NO. 9 (LINES 10 AND 11), PROVISION NO. 12 (LINE 4). WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF THE SOVIET SIDE AGREES WITH THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE TERM "DEVELOPMENT" WOULD INCLUDE ALL TESTING ACTIVITY.

7. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS SUGGESTED THAT USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS BE PERMITTED IN FIELD EXERCISES WITH TROOPS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF PROTECTION. THE U.S. SIDE, HOWEVER, STATED IN JULY THAT THE U.S. HAVE NOT FOUND IT NECESSARY TO USE AGENTS IN THAT MANNER. IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT EXERCISES OF THIS TYPE WOULD GIVE RISE TO SUSPICIONS CONCERNING THEIR REAL PURPOSES, WE WOULD

LIKE SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO HELP US IN UNDER-
STANDING THE SOVIET POSITION:

(A) WHY DOES THE SOVIET SIDE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO
USE LIVE CHEMICAL AGENTS IN TROOP EXERCISES FOR DEVELOPMENT
OF MEANS OF PROTECTION?

(B) FOR WHAT SPECIFIC PURPOSES WOULD SUCH TESTS BE CON-
DUCTED?

(C) WHAT KINDS OF AGREED LIMITATIONS DID THE SOVIET
SIDE HAVE IN MIND WHEN DRAFTING THE SECOND SENTENCE OF
PROVISION NO. 9?

(D) DOES THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO PROPOSE TO ALLOW THE USE
OF LETHAL AGENTS IN FIELD EXERCISES FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRAIN-
ING TROOPS TO USE THEIR PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT?

(E) HOW COULD STATES PARTIES BE ASSURED THAT FIELD
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EXERCISES WITH TROOPS USING LETHAL AGENTS DID NOT REPRESENT
CLANDESTINE OFFENSIVELY-ORIENTED ACTIVITY?

(F) PROVISION NO. 9 SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT TRANSFER OF
SINGLE-PURPOSE AGENTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES FOR USE IN SUCH
EXERCISES WOULD BE ALLOWED. IS THAT A CORRECT INTERPRETATION?

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ACTION ACDA-10

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 7290

I. ACCORDING TO BASIC PROVISION NO. 7, SINGLE-PURPOSE
CARCINOGENS, TERATOGENS, INCAPACITANTS AND IRRITANTS
WOULD BE PROHIBITED.

(A) WE WERE UNAWARE THAT CARCINOGENS AND TERATOGENS HAD POTENTIAL AS CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHY THE SOVIET SIDE FELT IT IMPORTANT TO MENTION THEM.

(B) WOULD ALL OTHER SINGLE-PURPOSE HARMFUL AGENTS BE PROHIBITED OR WOULD THE PROHIBITION BE LIMITED TO THE FOUR TYPES OF HARMFUL AGENTS THAT ARE SPECIFICALLY NAMED?

QUESTIONS ON DESTRUCTION

1) BASIC PROVISION NO. 2 SPECIFIES THAT FOLLOWING ENTRY INTO FORCE, STATES PARTIES SHOULD PROCEED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHICH THEY POSSESS. WE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION OF SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THIS BASIC PROVISION.

(A) WOULD DESTRUCTION OF UNFILLED MUNITIONS BE REQUIRED?

(B) HOW SOON AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE WOULD SUCH DESTRUCTION ACTIVITIES BE REQUIRED TO BEGIN.

(C) THE US SIDE HAS EXPLAINED THAT ITS EXISTING STOCKS OF CW AGENTS AND MUNITIONS COULD BE DESTROYED OVER A MINIMUM PERIOD OF 8 YEARS. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MUCH TIME THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIET-SIDE ESTIMATES IT WOULD REQUIRE TO COMPLETE ITS DESTRUCTION ACTIVITIES?

2) DOES THE SOVIET SIDE EXPECT THAT ALL INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES WHICH HAVE PRODUCED SINGLE-PURPOSE CHEMICAL AGENTS ON SINGLE-PURPOSE PRECURSORS WOULD BE DECLARED AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE QUANTITIES OF AGENTS AND PRECURSORS ARE DECLARED?

QUESTIONS ON VERIFICATION

1) IN NO. 17 IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE BE ESTABLISHED AT AN AGREED DATE AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION. WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR ANY SPECIFIC SOVIET VIEWS ON THE TIMING OF ITS ESTABLISHMENT.

2) THE TASKS OUTLINED IN BASIC PROVISIONS NO. 18 AND NO. 19 APPEAR TO ASSUME CONTINUING ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE COMMITTEE AT TIMES WHEN IT IS NOT IN SESSION. WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR SOVIET VIEWS ON HOW SUCH ACTIVITIES AS ANALYSIS OF DECLARATIONS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT.

3) BASIC PROVISION NO. 20 SEEMS TO BE SIMILAR TO PARA 3 OF ARTICLE II IN THE SOVIET DRAFT "TREATY ON COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS" CONTAINED IN CCD/523. HOWEVER, THE FORMULATIONS USED ARE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. IS BASIC PROVISION NO. 20 INTENDED TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES IDENTICAL TO THOSE PROPOSED IN THE TEST BAN TREATY.

4) WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ON-SITE CLARIFICATION
OUTLINED IN BASIC PROVISION NO. 20, WOULD THE REQUEST FOR SUCH
CLARIFICATION PASS THROUGH THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE? IF
NOT, WHAT WOULD BE THE PROCEDURE?

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5) IN THE EVENT A REQUEST FOR SUCH ON-SITE CLARIFICATION
WAS TURNED DOWN BY THE HOST COUNTRY, WHAT WOULD THE EFFECT
OF THIS ACTION BE ON THE VIABILITY OF THE TREATY? END TEXT
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